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4 Key benefits of understanding your enemy, for public safety professionals and security managers

19 July 2022 by David Harding 1 Comment

Crime prevention operations that focus on the criminal, their support networks, and methodologies can have significant benefits for security managers, and public safety professionals. This post will identify the benefits of such a focus, and how this can benefit security management, public safety, and crime prevention.

To illustrate the benefits, I will use a case study that was published on this website. But to summarize, in 2017 the Canberra suburb of Kambah had the dubious reputation for having the highest burglary crime rate in all of Canberra. To reduce burglary crime, I decided to utilise a method that I had successfully used against gangs, armed robbers, terrorists, and insurgents. Although obviously there would have to be changes to suit a residential area in Australia’s capital city. The solution required the deliberate and detailed focus on the Threat Actor, in this case burglars. A more in-depth summary can be found by following the below link: https://anshinconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Anshin-Consulting-Kambah-Case-Study.pdf

Through observation and engagement of the various deviant communities, I was able to identify weaknesses in peer and social networks within the ‘gangs’. Also, it was possible to observe the planning, preparation and intelligence gathering that potential burglars utilised. This information provided the basis for the development of interventions to counter burglar development and methodologies.

Interventions included directed information disseminated through the community group Neighbourhood Watch (NHW). This information included descriptions of the specific methodologies local burglars were using. For examples, how deviants identified their target house, where the burglars would leave their getaway vehicle, and how they conducted their surveillance. Residents were provided with ways and means to identify burglars in the process of planning their burglary, and ways to disturb the burglar during the burglar preparation and intelligence gathering phases.

This knowledge gave residents the ability to know who was in the vicinity with an intention to commit burglary, signs to watch for that would show when they would commit burglary, how they would go about their preparation and surveillance prior to committing burglary, and what to do about it. All before the burglar set foot on a property.

Benefits of using this methodology are:

Cost effective

By understanding the various beliefs and behaviours of Threat Actors and the communities that supported them, interventions can be specifically identified, developed, and targeted. This means that interventions can be specifically directed, and by extension, cost-effective. In addition, interventions can be evaluated in real time, and if necessary adapted to enhance efficiency.

Example:

The operation required approximately 40hrs of consulting time to determine the various beliefs and behaviors of the deviant communities.

The local community provided the observation sources and required no financial renumeration.

In 2011 the Australian Institute of Criminology calculated that the individual cost of burglary crime at $3,839 per incident, including intangibles. However, this costing did not include the use of police resources to investigate the crime, or the cost of putting a suspect through the judicial system, nor the cost of incarceration.

Exhaustive research failed to identify any other possible causes for the decrease in burglary crime.

The interventions were found to cause a 42% drop in burglary crime.

Efficient

The allocation of resources can be determined by the methodology that is observed to be used by the Threat Actor. Resources can then be specific and localised to the specific Threat Actor.

Example:

One of the interventions developed was a called a ‘high risk newsletter’ which was delivered to small neighbourhoods that had suffered repeat victimisation. This newsletter specifically identified how burglars were conducting their activities. These newsletters were also given to local youth gangs in the area.

Below is a quote from a former self acknowledged burglar.

“If you had walked up to us and handed each of us a newsletter of this type, I would not want to go back to this area for a long time. This says exactly what we used to do. I would be worried that you, or some of the neighbors would be watching all the time.”

This quote explains the reaction by the various groups of deviants, on identifying that their methodologies were known. They appeared to cease their burglary activities. Or if they wished to continue, they would have to move out of the area, as well as develop alternative methodologies.

There was no repeat victimization, during the program period, of any area that these newsletters were distributed in.

Active management

Knowing what is about to happen, where it will happen, how it will happen, and by whom, allows for pro-active agile actions to take place.

Examples:

Knowing where burglars would leave their getaway vehicles (most often bikes in this case) provided residents with the knowledge that burglars were working in their immediate area. This increased active and immediate counter-surveillance applied on the potential burglars. Based on feedback from resident observers, the effect was that burglars left the area.

Seizing the initiative

Early intervention in the Threat Actor’s development cycle, in preparation and intelligence gathering process, requires that the actor develop new and untested methodologies. This increases the risk to the Threat Actor, and ultimately, puts control of situations into the hands of the security manager.

Example:

The combination of the varying interventions used in this program meant that there was a significant increase in the risk of identification to deviants. An extreme fear of the deviant communities.

Although difficult to determine accurately, it is reasonable to assess that committed burglars moved to other areas. Whilst less committed deviants give up their deviant beliefs and behaviours. Given the dramatic reduction in burglary crime of 42%, and the increase in possible displacement crime of 10%, it could appear that many deviants gave up their acts of burglary.

As can be seen from the above, focusing on the Threat Actor can have substantial benefits for security management, public safety, and crime prevention. For the organisation seeking cost effectiveness and efficiency, the specific nature of selected interventions applicable to the local Threat Actor can bring substantial returns.

Active Management provides security management with the knowledge of who will attack, when they will attack, how and why they will attack. Allowing for interventions to be timely and specific to the location and Threat Actor.

In addition, when the organisation seizes the initiative, it gains control over those that intend to harm the organisation. The Threat Actor must ‘go back to the drawing board’ if they wish to avoid apprehension.

Reference

Trask, S. (2017, March 6). Canberra’s crime hotspots revealed. The Canberra Times.

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6035774/canberras-crime-hotspots-revealed/

Smith R et al. 2014. Counting the costs of crime in Australia: A 2011 estimate. Research and public policy series no. 129. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

https://www.aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/rpp129

Link to the case study:

https://anshinconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Anshin-Consulting-Kambah-Case-Study.pdf

The methodology describe above has been peer reviewed and published in the Journal of Applied Security Research. You can read the entire article by following the below link:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19361610.2021.1956268?src=

Filed Under: Blog Tagged With: Crime Prevention, Public Safety, Security Management

What criminals do not want you to know!

12 May 2022 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Understanding how criminals think and behave is the first step in developing interventions that will prevent crime. This post identifies the most important information criminals do not want you to know.

This is the first in a series of articles that specifically focus on the beliefs and behaviors of local crime criminals. That is, those criminals that commit residential burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft etc. These articles will focus on what these criminals do not want you, or anyone else, to know.

Much of the information below regarding how and what criminals, and potential criminals, believe and behave was observed during a crime prevention program conducted between 2018 and 2020. Essentially, the project used ethnographical observations and conversations to gather information on the beliefs and behaviors of individuals and youth gangs in a Canberra suburb. You can review the findings of the research published in the Journal of Applied Security Research (see references below)

One caveat to be stressed prior to understanding the beliefs and behaviors described below, is that the beliefs and behaviors are of specially identified deviant groups. The specific views of the deviants may not seem or be accurate. However, it must be stressed that these are THEIR beliefs. So, for the individuals concerned, they are truth. This is important to remember, especially if crime prevention interventions are to be developed and implemented.

The first belief that will be outlined in this series, is that criminals do not want Councils, police, or anyone else to know, is that crime is NOT opportunistic. Or, at least not opportunistic in the way that the term has become in common usage. Criminals gather intelligence, plan and prepare for their crimes.

At present opportunistic crime seems to imply that criminals are randomly walking around and happen upon, for example, an open window into a house, and spontaneously seize this opportunity to illegally enter the house.

To overcome this, owners use what in criminology is called Environmental Crime Prevention methods to prevent this type of event from occurring. For example, owners are often told to keep their yards clear of tools that might be of use to a burglar. The idea being to make it harder for the burglar to break in.

In addition, crime prevention awareness campaigns run by Councils, often suggest the use of a variety of Situational Crime Prevention methods. For example, that residents should use alarms, locks on doors and windows, and be aware of who may be visiting their neighbors etc.

Both above-mentioned methodologies focus on changing the mindset of the criminal at the target location. In practice, this means that the criminal sees the open window, identifies that there may be an opportunity to break into the house. However, on closer inspection the criminal also sees that there is nothing to assist in getting into the window, or that there is a sturdy lock on the front door. The criminal, on analyzing the situation, decides that there is too much risk of being observed. The criminal determines not to break in.

Both these theories have been proven to work well in the past. However, recent research is showing that there are shortcomings with these methods. This is being brought about by the changing level of expertise of criminals.

For example, Armatige, and Chun, have found that experienced burglars can be attracted to houses that have additional security systems, or open and visible front yards. Also, Harding observed that criminals, even young and inexperienced ones, take considerable measures to plan, prepare and gather intelligence about their target well before entering the target site. For example, some of the measures observed included, taking video of the external target property which can be later reviewed, at a time of the criminals choosing, to identify any security systems in place. Then the criminals would plan how they would enter the property, where they would leave their getaway vehicles, the route they would take to escape if surprised, and the equipment they would need to enter the identified target house. Preparation would include, gathering the required equipment, preparing entry and exit methods, and putting a person in a lookout position, prior to entry onto a property.

Why don’t criminals want people to know about their level of planning?

Because with everyone else focusing on the criminal’s target, it leaves criminals with plenty of time to determine who and how they will attack. And how they will get away. Criminals understand that if people understood what they were doing when the criminal was conducting their planning and preparation, the criminal could be easily identified and compromised.

As Harding identified, when those responsible for protection of assets focus on criminal planning, preparation and intelligence gathering activities, results such as the 42% drop in burglary crime in Kambah ACT, can be achieved.

References

Armitage, R. (2018, June). A more reliable glimpse’ – Re-positioning the offender in Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Crime Prevention and Communities Conference.

Chun, Y., & Lee, J. (2013). Traces of occupancy and its effect upon burglars’ residential target selection. Social Sciences, 2(3), 135–141. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20130203.15

David J. R. Harding (2021): Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviors, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions, Journal of Applied Security Research, https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2021.1956268

Filed Under: Blog

Summary of the published article ‘Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviors, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions’.

3 February 2022 by David Harding Leave a Comment

This brief article is as summary of the peer reviewed article titled ‘Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviours, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions’. This methodology was utilized to reduce the incidence of burglary crime by 42% in the Canberra suburb of Kambah from July 2018 to January 2020.

Generally, there are three approaches to crime prevention. Firstly, the Developmental approach, which seeks to reduce underlying social and economic pressures which may motivate a person to commit a crime. Secondly, the Environmental approach which seeks to change the physical environment that a potential offender enters and reduce the opportunities to commit crime. Thirdly, is the Criminal Justice System approach, which seeks to reduce the number of offenders in society.

Given that these approaches are not always successful, and also to reduce the increasing cost of crime, it may be beneficial to utilize other approaches. Such an approach may be to guide potential offenders from committing a crime. This could occur during the time that a person leaves a Developmental program influence, and the time that that same person is about to actuate a crime.

This paper provides empirical qualitative research that can be utilized by community safety specialists, shopping centre managers, law enforcement bodies, community groups and security specialists. This approach focuses on using ethnography, which uses field observation, to identify deviant community’s beliefs and behaviors. This approach then identifies subgroups of offenders that focus on burglary, and how they plan, prepare, and gather intelligence prior to actualization of a burglary crime.

Crime Pattern Theory identifies that most offenders will live, travel or work within several kilometers of their intended target. This research focused on deviant communities that were identified and living within the selected treatment area of Kambah West, a suburb of Canberra, ACT.

Using ethnographical techniques, these communities were approached and engaged with to determine and identify their beliefs and behaviours. Interventions were then developed that would have the greatest influence on potential offenders. The purpose being to cause a shift in belief and/or behaviours, which in turn would lead the deviant away from potential criminal burglary acts. The community interventions were delivered through the community organization of Kambah West Neighbourhood Watch.

Interventions included:

Active Management, which consisted of participant observation and informal discussions with the various deviant communities. The aim being to develop trust associations with the groups that could guide potential offenders away from offending acts.

Sibling Influence, which consisted of identifying particular older siblings of some deviants, who then influenced their younger siblings to not commit burglary crime.

Neighbourhood Watch Newsletters, which alerted the treatment area’s residents to the methods the deviant burglars were utilizing. This included how the deviants were planning, preparing, and gathering intelligence prior to undertaking a burglary. These newsletters also identified measures that could be used by residents that could counter the planning, preparation and intelligence gathering efforts of deviants.

NHW public meetings, which explained to residents the activities and methods that deviant communities were using. Also explained were measures that could be used by residents to neutralize deviant activities.

Specialized newsletters, which alerted residents living in targeted areas that deviants were planning to conduct burglaries in their areas. These newsletters were also provided to deviant communities within those areas as a means to show them that their activities were known, and were being watched.

Results

Results were gathered from data collected from conversations with deviant burglars, their support networks, peers and siblings, and residents of the treatment area. These conversations indicated that the interventions had the intended effect. Which was to guide potential deviants along non-deviant pathways.

ACT Policing provided crime related incident data regarding the frequency and location of burglary crime within the treatment and control areas. Analysis of this data indicated that the incidence of burglary crime reduced by 42% from the pre-intervention period.

In addition, a detailed review was conducted to identify other possible reasons that could explain the reduction in the incidence of burglary. Investigations reviewed Police crime reduction operations, community developmental programs, changes to the demographics and population of the area, and the possibility of bias from the participants under observation and discussion. In all these aspects there is no plausible reason for the decrease in criminal activity.

This approach, if combined with developmental and environmental crime prevention methodologies could produce significant benefits.

Filed Under: Blog Tagged With: Crime Prevention

Learn the different skill levels of the Threat Actors you are up against.

10 November 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Learning the different skill levels of burglars within an area lead to interventions that work.

Some time ago, a comment from a reader was made regarding how the ‘intent to actualisation’ cycle could be different for the various skill levels of criminals. This post will provide a brief answer to that comment.

The ‘intent to actualisation’ cycle, or criminal development pathway, referred to above can be defined as the pathway that an individual processes through from the initial development of deviant beliefs and behaviours, through to, and including the time that the individual acts on those beliefs and behaviours.

The process generally commences with the community that the person comes from where belief systems accept particular deviant behaviours. For example, that it is acceptable to burgle a person’s residence. Then the person will develop trust associations with likeminded people who harbour the same intentions. For example, through meetings with peers, siblings at school where conversations may centre around methodology, reasoning, and purpose, leading up to the development of intent to burgle a residence etc. Then the person turns that intent to actualization, where the person will take actions to carry out that intent. These actions are to gather intelligence, plan and prepare their intended attack to harm someone or something.

Using the last major project conducted by Anshin Consulting as an example , the identified communityies, consisted of youth aged in their early teens. All had deviant beliefs that included burglary, and all were observed to act on those beliefs. However, individuals within the group seemed to prefer to conduct their burglaries with specifically selected peer members. Observations of the various subgroups provide examples of how various skill levels of this community of deviants.

The amateurs of the group spent little time in planning their activities. For example, one group of three deviants was observed walking on route to one of their ‘hang out’ areas. On the way there, one individual within the group noticed a residence with the garage door open. All three members of this group were observed walking down the driveway and into the garage. This group had identified an opportunity, and immediately took steps to burgle the garage. They did not conduct a reconnaissance of the surrounding area, nor the residence itself to determine if occupied. When confronted they did have a cover story, of ‘have you seen our dog, he has run away’.

It is unknown what they would have done with stolen equipment, had they been successful.

On another occasion, intermediate members from this ‘gang’ were better prepared. This group identified their target residence, planned and prepared themselves. For example, a member of this gang was seen walking past a residence. He apparently saw an opportunity for burglary. He continued to walk past the property while using his mobile phone to record the outside and surrounding area of the property. Sometime later, this person returned with two other gang members. All three left their pushbikes some distance from the residence down an adjacent laneway. One member was stationed slightly away from the residence but with a good field of view of the street and surrounding area. The other two gang members approached the residence, taking note of the mail within the letter box. These two gang members started to climb over a fence that would give access to the back yard of the residence.

It was at that time that the lookout identified that he was being directly observed by an onlooker. The lookout then immediately shouted to the two gang members in the process of climbing over the fence. The two gang members immediately jumped down, and all three ran to their pushbikes and rode away.

This example shows how these intermediate burglars took the time to plan their entry, check occupancy, had a look out, and an escape method. What they lacked was the discipline to continually observe their surrounding area, and better timing of attack.

The professionals of the gang also took the time to plan and prepare their activities. And what to do with their stolen items. These members seemed to only work with each other, although they socialized with the other peers of their gang.

This group would conduct their planning similarly to that described above. However, they had the disciple to maintain watch on their surrounding area. When they had completed their burglary, they would disperse their gains with older associates and siblings. They believed that this would increase the difficulty for law enforcement to get a successful apprehension should the burglars be identified, and their own residences searched by law enforcement authorities. These gang members knew what they wanted from a burglary, how to get it, and how to disperse it for greatest gain.

The above examples show the different behaviours specific to each group. Even with the same goal in mind, each group conducted their activities differently. This not only included the different activities of planning, preparation and intelligence gathering, but also different levels of discipline, knowledge and operational skill levels.

In the above example, the understanding of these different levels led to the development of crime prevention interventions specific to each group. The overall effect being a 42% drop in burglary crime in the area. The specific case study related to this operation described above can be found by following the below link: https://anshinconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Anshin-Consulting-Kambah-Case-Study.pdf

Filed Under: Blog Tagged With: Burglars, Skill levels, Threat Actors

Skill levels of criminal offenders

11 October 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Understanding the skill level of criminal offenders can lead crime prevention practitioners to better interventions and security risk treatment options.

As a security industry instructor and crime prevention consultant, I have been asked what method do I use to determine criminal offender types? And, why is it useful to differentiate between different types? In this post I will identify the methods I use and why.

Criminologists may distinguish the types of criminal offenders by determining the ‘risk-to-yield’ ratio (comparing the risk that the offender is willing to take v’s the potential benefit to the offender), or the criminal history of the offender and the amount of planning and preparation that has gone into the offence.

However, the Australian Institute of Criminology has developed an alternative way, which can be very useful for practitioners.

Generally speaking, you can classify offenders by the level of skill that is utilised in their criminal development pathway. This will lead you to: Amateurs, Intermediates and Professionals. 

Amateurs will generally commit crimes of opportunity. That is, amateurs will likely be in what they perceive to be, the right place at the right time. For the amateur, little thought, and relatively no planning goes into how the offence will be committed, how the offender will escape once the offence has been committed, or details about what how to acquire, or what to do with, weapons used in the offence. In addition, these criminal offenders will often live in close proximity to where the offence takes place. Many drug and alcohol related crimes are committed from within this group, as well as ‘crimes of passion’.

At the other end of the criminal spectrum are what are considered to be the professional offender. This type of criminal offender is much less likely to undertake opportunistic offences, but rather conduct detailed planning, carry out reconnaissance, be highly motivated, have access to required tools, and know what to expect from their offence. These offenders often become dedicated to particular forms of offence such as high-level burglary, armoured car robberies, assassinations and terrorism. Also, these offenders may have received some form of training, perhaps within the military, prison system or overseas terrorist camps.

In the middle are the intermediate criminal offenders, which as the name suggests, sit somewhere between the amateur and the professional. These offenders understand the risks involved in opportunity crimes, and will therefore, undertake some level of planning and preparation prior to committing their offence. These offenders are not as committed to their craft as professionals, nor as dedicated to one particular form of offence. Whilst these offenders will take steps to ensure their success, such as escape routes, weapons, equipment and measures to distribute their gains, these measures will not be as thorough, nor as covert, as those of professional criminals.

Knowing the type of person (criminal) you are up against can give you an insight into how that type of offender will conduct their crime. This then provides a better understanding so as to enhance better selection of crime prevention interventions that will counter each type of criminal offender. For example, developing an understanding the variety of types of offenders in a recent research study in Kambah, ACT, led to a to a 42% drop in burglary crime over a 19 month period.

Filed Under: Blog Tagged With: criminal offenders, skill level

New Case Study in Insights and Research

22 September 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Today Anshin Consulting has posted a Case Study that we were involved with in 2019. The Case Study reviews the work that was done in Kambah, ACT, to reduce burglary crime. The Case Study shows who the community was up against, what was done, and how the community, through Neighbourhood Watch, was able to get burglary crime to reduce by 42%.

You can read or download the Case Study by following the this link:

https://anshinconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Anshin-Consulting-Kambah-Case-Study.pdf

Filed Under: Blog Tagged With: Case Study, Crime Prevention, Threat Management

New Research Article

6 September 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Summary of using Ethnography to develop crime prevention interventions.

Anshin Consulting has published an Audio Presentation of the article “Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviors, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions.” Which was published in the Journal of Applied Security Research.

To download the Audio Power Point presentation, titled ‘Summary of using Ethnography to develop crime prevention interventions.’, follow the below link to the Research and Insights page of Anshin Consulting, then click on the article to download your copy of the Audio Presentation:

https://anshinconsulting.com/insights-and-research/.

To view the original article, follow this link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19361610.2021.1956268?src=

Filed Under: Blog

Publication in Journal of Applied Security Research

10 August 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

David Harding’s paper on using Ethnography to identify deviant behaviors, then implementing crime prevention measures has been published in the Journal of Applied Security Research.

You can find the paper by following the below link:

Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviors, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions: Journal of Applied Security Research: Vol 0, No 0 (tandfonline.com)

Filed Under: Blog

Understand the process, prevent the attack.

5 July 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

Understanding the Criminal Development Pathway, the process that a criminal or terrorist undergoes prior to an attack, can provide opportunities to guide, counter or neutralise the criminal before they commit the crime.

The attack at Parramatta Police Head Quarters on Friday 2 October 2015 serves as a reminder of the development pathway that a criminal takes prior to making an actual attack. Using the incident that occurred at the Parramatta Police Head Quarters as a case study, and accepting that at the time of writing there is little evidence available to make educated judgements, it is possible to develop an understanding of the process that the perpetrator went through prior to his attack. It may also be possible to identify some measures that could have been utilised to guide, counter or neutralise the offender prior to that attack. The purpose of this article is to illustrate that by focusing on the criminal and their development pathway it is possible to guide counter or neutralise a criminal or terrorist prior to them making an attack.

As a brief outline, a criminal or a terrorist’s development commences within the communities that the person belongs to, where there is an acceptance of a particular criminal behaviour. From this point a person will seek out likeminded associates that share similar views to the person. Those views may develop a person’s intent to harm others. However, intent to harm others still requires the physical actions of planning, preparation and intelligence gathering if a successful attack is to be made. For the law enforcement and security professional, be it at policy or tactical level, it is imperative to understand this process. For understanding the process can lead to early identification of a threat actor, prior to that actor making an attack.

The first stage of a criminal’s development pathway commences with the community that the person comes from. In this case the offender, named Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad, is believed to have been of Kurdish decent originating in eastern Iraq or western Iran. Some media reports state that it was assessed as unlikely that members of a ethnic group that is currently bearing the brunt of the attacks made by the Islamic State (IS) would undertake an attack in a Western country such as Australia. This reporting is unfortunate, as it does not take into account the fact that that particular area of Iraq and Iran is the birthplace of the violent Jihad Salifits terrorist group Ansar al Islam, which has close links to the tribes of that area. Ansar al Islam is currently still operating within the Kurdish Regional Governate of Iraq. It was also Ansar al Islam that was instrumental in the initial development of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is now currently known as the Islamic State. If Farhad Jabar Khalil Mohammad origins lie within this community, then he almost certainly would have had acceptance to harm others, especially Westerners.

However, just because parts of a particular community accept criminal or terrorist behaviour, does not mean that the community will undertake that behaviour. It is therefore common in a criminal’s development to seek out likeminded persons within their community who have similar belief patterns to themselves. Again, using current media reports, it would appear that the individual perpetrator of the above incident had not come to the attention of police. However, several close associates had. Although difficult to prove at this point in time, it is likely that it was these close associates that may have turned the perpetrators intent into action.

However, intent alone does not necessarily transform into a crime. It requires the physical actions of planning, preparation and intelligence gathering to undertake a successful attack. In this case, media reports have identified that the perpetrator acquired a firearm, went to a mosque, and then travelled to the exact spot where he was able to make his attack. This shows that the perpetrator had indeed made a plan of the attack he was going to undertake, he appears to have prepared himself both physically and spiritually, and then proceeded to a identified location to make his attack. Once in location he appears to have waited for some time and in such a way that appeared so unusual that some witnesses were able to take pictures and video, which was reportedly uploaded to YouTube prior to the fatal shooting.

Of course understanding, and even identifying a criminal or terrorist’s development pathway may still not be sufficient in preventing a criminal attack. Measures must be put in place that will guide, counter or neutralise the perpetrator prior to an attack. Continuing to utilise the incident that occurred on Friday 2 October as a case study, the first stage for security professionals is to develop an understanding of the communities that may come into contact with facilities under their responsibility. Then, identify which communities may accept particular types of criminal behaviours, and develop ways to guide the community away from such belief systems. In this case, engagement with some segments of the local Kurdish community that illustrated the open nature of Australian society may have proved useful. In addition, closer attention may be required by both governments and facility holders to develop contacts within ‘at risk’ communities that may provide early identification of small groups of individuals that may develop more stringent intentions to harm others. And finally in the last line of defence, more attention may be required in the training of access control security guards. The current training often centres on reaction scenarios and drills, with primary focus on a person’s ability to access a facility. It may be prudent to enhance this training to include a focus on what is happening outside their area of responsibility.

Unfortunately, such a shift in thinking is away from the current research into the causal reason for criminal behaviour and the management of the likelihood of that behaviour. However, focus on the pathway that a criminal takes can lead to ways and means to guide, counter or neutralise that criminal prior to an attack.

Filed Under: Blog

Training Services

11 May 2021 by David Harding Leave a Comment

A variety of specialised security courses are available on an ‘in house’ basis. The courses are conducted by security professionals experienced in both large and small group facilitation and are specifically tailored to suit the client’s needs.

Filed Under: Services

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Recent Posts

  • 4 Key benefits of understanding your enemy, for public safety professionals and security managers
  • What criminals do not want you to know!
  • Summary of the published article ‘Using Ethnography to Identify Deviant Behaviors, for the Development of Crime Prevention Interventions’.
  • Learn the different skill levels of the Threat Actors you are up against.
  • Skill levels of criminal offenders

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